Seal Sequential
Continuity-of-presence evidence based on successive surprise checks, without GPS or cameras.
| Version | 2.0 — 15 September 2026 |
|---|---|
| Intended audience | Technical, security, integration and partner teams |
| Status | Technical description based on public information; implementation parameters to be confirmed |
Purpose and scope
Create a stronger record than a single check-in for lone workers, guard tours, contractor assignments and compliance duties requiring continued presence over time.
Operating principle
- A sequence is configured with a duration, check rules and eligible people or roles.
- The system triggers checks at non-predictable times.
- The person responds using their live Seal mechanism.
- Each response contributes to a time-stamped continuity record.
- The final record identifies successful, missed or expired checks under the configured rules.
Targeted threats
- Single check-in followed by departure
- Sharing of static credentials
- Manual falsification of a tour
- Disproportionate monitoring using geolocation or video
Components and responsibilities
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Verified organisation or publisher | Establishes identity, channels or domains and manages authorised people. |
| User or approver | Presents live evidence or participates in authorisation under policy. |
| Seal service | Evaluates necessary verification elements and returns a result limited to the use case. |
| Integrating system | Binds the Seal result to the exact action, applies business rules and retains required audit data. |
| Verifier | Checks the result in context and does not interpret it as a guarantee of truth. |
Data and privacy
The stated public principle is data minimisation: no GPS, biometrics or cameras for identity and presence modules; local browser computation when a media or document module processes a file; and retention of irreversible fingerprints and limited metadata rather than source content. The exact fields, retention periods, logs, subprocessors and transfers must be confirmed in a data-processing appendix.
Expected security properties
- Temporal freshness of live evidence
- Separation of roles and factors
- Binding of the result to the context or action
- Minimisation and non-disclosure of source content
- Proportionate traceability without turning Seal into a central identity database
Limitations and assumptions
- The system produces evidence of successive responses, not continuous physical observation.
- Randomisation, tolerance and escalation rules must be specified for each deployment.
- Accessibility, occupational safety and connectivity constraints must be planned.
Items to confirm before integration
- API, request and response schemas, authentication and quotas
- Applicable algorithms, key lengths, entropy sources and rotation
- Time tolerances, clock synchronisation and expiration handling
- Error handling, revocation, recovery and service continuity
- Logging, retention, location, deletion and regulatory obligations
- Penetration testing, independent cryptographic review and vulnerability disclosure process
Public references
- https://seal.lifaio.com/go
- https://lifaio.com/seal-lifaio/
Notice: this document describes the publicly communicated conceptual operation. It does not replace an API specification, cryptographic analysis or independent security audit.
UK patent applications pending: GB2619490.2 · GB2619948.9 · GB2620153.3 · GB2620211.9 · GB2620220.0 · GB2620253.1 · GB2620315.8 · GB2620629.2 · GB2621074.0 · GB2621382.7 · GB2622122.6 · GB2622135.8
