Seal Standard
Point-in-time verification of a person associated with an organisation using a live code renewed every 60 seconds.
| Version | 2.0 — 15 September 2026 |
|---|---|
| Intended audience | Technical, security, integration and partner teams |
| Status | Technical description based on public information; implementation parameters to be confirmed |
Purpose and scope
Reduce impersonation risk during an in-person or remote interaction, including at a door, by telephone, at reception or in field operations. Seal establishes who was verified and when; it does not determine whether that person’s statements are true.
Operating principle
- The organisation undergoes prior verification.
- An authorised person displays a 16-digit code on their device for the current time window.
- The verifier enters the code in the public Seal interface.
- Seal returns publishable verification information, including the organisation, verification level and declared contact details.
- The result must be interpreted within its time window and the context of the interaction.
Targeted threats
- Copied badge, logo, uniform or identity card
- Cloned voice or telephone impersonation
- Reuse of an old capture
- False affiliation with an organisation
Components and responsibilities
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Verified organisation or publisher | Establishes identity, channels or domains and manages authorised people. |
| User or approver | Presents live evidence or participates in authorisation under policy. |
| Seal service | Evaluates necessary verification elements and returns a result limited to the use case. |
| Integrating system | Binds the Seal result to the exact action, applies business rules and retains required audit data. |
| Verifier | Checks the result in context and does not interpret it as a guarantee of truth. |
Data and privacy
The stated public principle is data minimisation: no GPS, biometrics or cameras for identity and presence modules; local browser computation when a media or document module processes a file; and retention of irreversible fingerprints and limited metadata rather than source content. The exact fields, retention periods, logs, subprocessors and transfers must be confirmed in a data-processing appendix.
Expected security properties
- Temporal freshness of live evidence
- Separation of roles and factors
- Binding of the result to the context or action
- Minimisation and non-disclosure of source content
- Proportionate traceability without turning Seal into a central identity database
Limitations and assumptions
- A valid code may still be targeted by real-time relay; anti-relay mechanisms and the presentation channel must be documented per scenario.
- Verification does not automatically authorise a transaction and does not replace business controls.
- A compromised device or organisational account may change the threat model.
Items to confirm before integration
- API, request and response schemas, authentication and quotas
- Applicable algorithms, key lengths, entropy sources and rotation
- Time tolerances, clock synchronisation and expiration handling
- Error handling, revocation, recovery and service continuity
- Logging, retention, location, deletion and regulatory obligations
- Penetration testing, independent cryptographic review and vulnerability disclosure process
Public references
- https://seal.lifaio.com/go
- https://lifaio.com/seal-lifaio/
Notice: this document describes the publicly communicated conceptual operation. It does not replace an API specification, cryptographic analysis or independent security audit.
UK patent applications pending: GB2619490.2 · GB2619948.9 · GB2620153.3 · GB2620211.9 · GB2620220.0 · GB2620253.1 · GB2620315.8 · GB2620629.2 · GB2621074.0 · GB2621382.7 · GB2622122.6 · GB2622135.8
